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BOOK REVIEWS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY.

By Roscoe Pound. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1957. Pp. vi,
207. $3.50.
To epitomize 800 years of constitutional development in four hourly
lectures is a challenging undertaking. The story which Dean Pound
retells in this series (originally delivered at Wabash College in 1945) is
the timeless one of the "development of our constitutional guarantees
out of the medieval faith in law, of how the idea of those guarantees
became involved in the very idea of law, and of how that idea maintaine'c
itself against masterful monarchs and in eras of profound social and
economic change to become the law of the land in formative America."
(p. vi)
This and much more is accomplished within the four-period framework: "Medieval England" (to the Reformation) -the bases, beginnings, distinctive features of the Common Law and constitutionalism;
"The Era of the Tudors and Stuarts"-royal prerogative matched and
checkmated by lex terrde, "common right and reason"; "In the American
Colonies"-parliamentary supremacy itself challenged by repeated appeals to "ftindamental law"'and to history; "From the Revolution to the
Constitution"-chartered "inalienable rights of Englishmen" finally
mide explicit in written constitutions which at once began to be judicially
construed as*the supiene fundamental law.
Dean Pound thus stops with the'adoption of the Federal
Bill of
Rights,' characterizing American constitutional development along with
the English. The unifying theme is* the'Common, Law heritage and
technique, "the sur&-footed Angl6-Saxofi's 'habit of dealing with things
as they arise, and in the .light of experience."' (p. 19)' Over and over, it
is stressed that "Law," -ithin thistradition, is a'fuidamental, justifiable
rule binding. ofi rulers and peoples alike-not 'the. mere product of government or of -authority., Capacity to challenge. the procedural operations of
governinent-.is'the basic distinctive feature.:: Here is 'the nub 'of it: Government by consent'd&eloped and maintained itself, h6t because Englishmen originally- w ere, mote .battache'd t6 th'eir' interest "'r
'to .the idea -of a
universal natural law, but-because, from the time of-Magna -Carta onward,
rulers and ruled habitually particularized their powerg, 'righs,'and
relations; and cast,them into documentary, pseudo-contractual form. "B0ti
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parties then proceeded to regard such documents as bases for subsequent
interpretation and bargaining, especially whenever "arbitrary" or "unreasonable" practices threatened the pledged orderly administration of
justice according to the "law of the land."
Intense historical- or procedural-mindednessSticklerism- this
might be called. Certainly the Stuarts and Hanovers thought of it in
this light. Yet more was involved. An Englishman, convinced that a
rule laid down by his sovereign violated natural right and reason, had a
"place to go."
(cf. p. 10)
From Angevin times onward "the
place to go" was to the royal chancery and courts. Judges developed
an independence, a professionalism, and at length, a body of precedent
that became bases for limitations, first on royal prerogative, then on parliamentary, and finally on legislative-executive power. A point often overlooked is that this same belief in natural law pervaded the Roman and
medieval worlds. In England it combined with an individualistic layprofessional system of rights protection. This we tell ourselves, at times
pretty smugly, is the distinctive Anglo-American way. When an entire
people commits itself to a legal-political system of this order and is
provident and fortunate enough to develop machinery and traditions
that permit individual challenge of arbitrary authority, results are
precious, and as the world has gone, very nearly unique.
To overlook this enduring lay element and contribution would be
to miss half the story-and almost the point of the English and American
Revolutions and the Civil War Amendments. We unquestionably owe
much to lawyers; but we owe even more to a Law that progressively has
"constitutionalized" political experience and translated a vague, evolving
ethico-moral sense and quest for personal and social justice into "the law
of the land." Laymen occasionally have led lawyers here. Research for
Lord Mansfield's decision abolishing slavery in England' was done for
Francis Hargrave by Granville Sharp, a learned linendraper-fishmonger
turned government clerk.2 The lay-philanthropist William Penn compiled
and published the first American law treatise in 1687-fittingly entitled
The Excellent Privilege of Liberty and Property, a commentary on the
law of the land clause of Magna Carta made up from Coke. A band of
Oberlin divinity students and evangelists successfully propagated the
Abolitionists' constitutional argument against slavery and race discrimination. The overlapping guarantees of Section One of our Fourteenth
Amendment today preserve and extend their accomplishment.
1.
2.

The Case of James Sommersett, 20 How. St. Tr. 1 (1772).
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While we readily concede all this, essentially it is an independent,
historically-endowed judiciary-one commissioned to weigh competing
individual and social claims under guidance of professional counsel, and
to test and interpret the statutes (product of yet another branch of that
medieval Curia Regis)-which vitalizes and distinguishes this system,
and moves us to reverence, and at times to wonder.
Broadly viewed, there can be no doubt that the doctrines and ideals
of due process and equal protection, conceived substantively in the United
States, constitute the core of Anglo-American constitutionalism, as they
do also of Dean Pound's narrative. In some ways these lectures are the
more arresting and evocative for their failure to rehearse American detail.
The mind readily extrapolates the current and familiar; experience and
dissent recall the possible weakness-the ever-growing subjectivity, the
potentially universal reach of due process, its built-in ambiguity, seemingly unfettered discretion, indiscriminate lumping of issties that often
benefit from more precise analysis. Yet, might not American judicial
review and supremacy have proved unworkable without this flexible,
introverted instrument?
Whether this last point be conceded or not it is plain that there have
been advantages as well as hazards. How, then, are we to interpret the
public's misgivings, the recurrent disillusionment with due process? Maturity of judicial review presumes a maturity of attitude toward it. The
Justices' own humility in this field is understandable. (Justice Jackson
reminded his associates that new and changing problems "cast us more
than we would choose upon our own judgment .

.

.

. [W] e act- in these

matters not by authority of our competence but by force of our commissions.") 3 Much more difficult to accept and understand are the current
evasions of some bar groups, unreservedly committed (professionally) to
the principle of judicial supremacy, yet blind to present obligations, mute
before assaults on a beleaguered Court. Certainly the time has come for
more affirmative leadership: American ideals and the vitality of our legal
system alike demand that race relations be squared with the ninety year
old guarantees of the Constitution.
Constitutionalism and due process make heavy demands on more
than the Bench. That is the essence of this story. As Americans heretofore have thought of it, it is the premise of Liberty itself.
Dean Pound was here unable to review these later issues and cases.
People never have been, and never can be, of one mind about many of
them. The point is that for us there can be no turning back now from
3.

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943).
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,Runnymede or Marbury4 or Yick Wo v. Hopkins.5 The Harvard philos-opher Josiah - Royce saw the whole of ethics and civilization and law
rooted in the ideal of "loyalty to loyalty." "Loyalty to loyalty to law"
best epitomizes Dean Pound's vision of our inheritance and our future.
Grateful readers of these lectures accordingly can hope for another series
on the problems inherent in contemporary due process and equal protection-themes brilliantly discussed in recent articles by Judge Hastie'
and Professor Kadish.7 The lessons and the way ahead again are fit
subjects for the Dean of American jurisprudence.
HOWARD -JAY GRAHAMt

By Albert P. Blaustem and ClarDESEGREGATION AND THE LAW.
ence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 1957. Pp. xiv, 327. $5.00.
After four years the decision of the Supreme Court in the school
segregation cases' is still defied in large areas of the country. This
defiance by people who regard themselves as law-abiding is necessarily
coupled with a deep feeling that the Court's decision lacks legal justifica.tion: that the Constitution itself does not bar racial segregation and that
.the.'Supreme Court stepped outside its competence as interpreter of thie
-Constitution to impose upon the South the personal preferences of the
-justices.
The authors of Desegregationand the Law have devoted their book
to this critical impasse. They seem to have realized that the situation
calls not only for accurate information but also for a calm and temperate
attitude which alone can permit a reasoned approach to the problem.
The authors bring both, in generous measure, to the book. Their stated
goal is not to debate the constitutional issues but rather to explain the
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
5. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). "Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
stil within the prohibition of the Constitution." Id. at 373.
6. Hastie, Judicial Method in Due Process Inquiry, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW
326 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
7. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
' Bibliographer, Los Angeles County Law Library; Guggenheim Fellow, 1958.
1. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

